TT Talk - When a ship in distress calls, how should ports respond?
Introduction
Ports exist to keep trade moving. Occasionally, they are asked to do something fundamentally different: provide refuge for a ship in distress. Whether the incident involves fire, structural damage, cargo instability or loss of propulsion, these situations are rarely straightforward. They are high-pressure, highly visible, and can become politically charged. For the port, this is a risk decision with potentially long-lasting consequences.
A practical response requires more than an immediate acceptance or refusal. It requires a structured assessment of where the hazard can be managed with the greatest control, and how operational, safety, environmental, and stakeholder impacts will be sustained over time.
Why refuge is not a simple yes or no
A common misconception is that acknowledging a casualty automatically means accepting it. There are international guidelines[1] setting out the expectations on coastal states; some nations have adopted mandatory procedures. However, each situation must be assessed on its own merits, balancing operational capability, safety considerations, and environmental impact.
In reality there are multiple parties that will need to be involved, balancing the risks carefully. Simply refusing entry does not remove the hazard - it can push the problem offshore, where conditions may be less controlled and consequences can escalate. The question to be addressed is therefore not whether to accept the ship, but where the risk is best managed.
This framing supports decision-making that is risk-led rather than reaction-led. It also creates space for all interests, including states, ports and ship to consider all appropriate refuge options that provide control without resulting in unnecessary exposure to the coastal or port environment.
A place of refuge is not always a port
Refuge should not be automatically equated with berthing. In many cases, the safest solution may be an anchorage, sheltered waters, or a managed offshore position. Bringing a casualty directly alongside may introduce new exposures to infrastructure, workforce and nearby communities.
In practice, ‘refuge’ is better understood as a spectrum of options. A ship may be granted refuge in a controlled location that allows stabilisation, assessment, and specialist response, without the additional hazards created by immediate berthing. The correct outcome may therefore be to keep the risk away from the port, rather than bring it inside.
This distinction is especially important where the incident involves ongoing instability, uncertain cargo behaviour, or limited availability of controlled space ashore.
The operational reality, this will not be quick
One of the most consistent misunderstandings is duration. A ship granted refuge is unlikely to stay for only a few days. If a ship is brought into the port environs, it may remain for weeks or months, particularly where cargo discharge, investigation or repair are required.
This may have consequences for berth availability, commercial operations, access and security, and stakeholder expectations. Ports should therefore assume from the outset that this is a long-duration event, not a short stabilisation exercise.
Ports should assume from the outset that this is a long-duration event, not a short stabilisation exercise.
Treating refuge as a long-duration scenario changes the planning baseline. It encourages the decision-makers, including port authorities to consider how the wider port estate will continue operating, how cordons and access routes will be maintained, and how communication will be managed as the situation evolves.
Space, not berth, is often the real constraint
When managing casualty ships, decision-makers often discover that the port’s most valuable asset is not quay length, it is space. Significant areas may be required for damaged or contaminated cargo, waste streams, quarantine or isolation zones, and temporary storage pending inspection or disposal.
Without sufficient controlled space, a ship incident can quickly evolve into a port-wide operational problem. Space constraints can also drive risk decisions, for example, whether cargo can be safely discharged, segregated, monitored, and disposed of, and whether the port can maintain separation from other operations.
This means early assessment should extend beyond where the ship might be positioned, to where consequential materials and activities will be managed and controlled.
Cargo is often the real risk
While initial attention focuses on the ship, it is frequently the cargo that defines the risk profile. Cargoes that appear benign can become problematic when damaged, heated or exposed to water. Examples described include materials that self-heat or smoulder, contaminated consumer goods, and overweight or structurally compromised containers.
In these situations, cargo behaviour directly drives handling methodology, equipment requirements, and most importantly, the safety of personnel. For ports, this reinforces the value of early cargo-led assessment and of planning for the practical constraints of managing damaged, unstable, or contaminated cargo within a live operating environment.
It is frequently the cargo that defines the risk profile [...] cargo behaviour directly drives handling methodology, equipment requirements, and most importantly, the safety of personnel.
It also supports a structured approach to isolation and control. Where cargo defines the hazard, it is often the cargo management plan, rather than the berth plan, that determines whether refuge can be provided safely.
Fire changes everything
Fire remains one of the most challenging scenarios for a port to manage. It is complex, unpredictable, and shipboard events inevitably present local landside emergency responders with unfamiliar environments. Where a ship fire is ongoing, particularly in scenarios such as vehicle carriers, the risks are amplified, with heat, toxicity, and potential escalation all relevant.
Accepting such a ship can effectively transfer the hazard from offshore into a populated and infrastructure-dense environment. Ports are understandably hesitant in these scenarios but are urged to collaborate with all interested parties.
Advance engagement between ports and local fire and rescue services is essential to educate on ship-specific hazards, agree response expectations, and rehearse practical constraints including access, water supply, foam capability, cordons, and air monitoring. Preparedness reduces the likelihood that critical limitations are discovered only after a ship is alongside.
What good looks like
Where refuge situations are handled successfully, the difference is rarely luck, it is preparedness. States and ports that perform well typically have clear decision-making frameworks, established relationships with authorities, salvors and insurers, pre-identified refuge options (both alongside and offshore), and experience gained through exercises and scenario planning.
Where refuge situations are handled successfully, the difference is rarely luck, it is preparedness.
Such a coastal response is not improvising under pressure, it is executing a plan. In practice, that plan helps decision-makers balance competing objectives, maintain control of information, and manage the consequences over time.
Effective preparedness also supports proportionate decision-making. A port does not need to default to acceptance or refusal, it needs the capability to input appropriately to decision-making that mitigates the risks, implements appropriate controls, and maintains the operational discipline required to sustain the response.
Conclusion
Places of refuge are not routine operational matters. They are rare, complex and highly visible events that require clear judgement and decisive leadership. Effective coastal and port response is not a simple yes or no.
The measures of success are assessment of where the risk can be best managed, the application of the controls, coordination, and endurance required to manage the event over time. Ultimately, refuge is not about where a ship may want to go, it is about where the risk can be best managed.
- Author
- Harry Palmer
- Date
- 02/06/2026
